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Whichever route, of those distinguished above, it is determined to pursue, the teacher will be more or less at liberty to make his selection from among all the different combinations of means, which have received the name of methods of instruction. He should not, however, forget the influence of methods upon the development of the intellectual faculties; but, bearing in mind that it will belong to him, as much to supply the pupil with means for self-education, after he is removed from the eye of the master, as to convey positive knowledge to his mind, he should rather choose those methods, which call the mental faculties into most active, continued and beneficial exercise.

We have now, in general terms, stated that which is to be accomplished in the education of the deaf and dumb. Methods must next occupy our attention, together with the material instruments which they employ, and by the combination of which they are distinguished from one another. Since, however, all methods equally propose to teach, or rather to create for the deaf and dumb a language, we will first present some preliminary considerations, peculiar to no individual system.

'There is,' says Degerando, 'in the operations of the human mind, a primitive and principal phenomenon, to which all others attach themselves, and upon which the creation and the use of our languages exercise a considerable influence. This phenomenon, which we will denominate intuition, is properly the act by which the mind beholds the objects of its knowledge. Intuition is, to the human intelligence, the sole fountain of all light.'

Intuition is of two kinds, distinguished by Degerando as real, and rational. The mind, by means of the former, immediately and directly perceives whatever actually exists. This is the intuition of things and their images. The other is the perception of conditions and relations, which subsist among notions previously formed. It is the intuition of reflection and reasoning. It is the immediate act of judging. The objects of real intuition pertain alike to the physical, the intellectual and the moral worlds. It is by rational intuition that we seize the results of comparison, perceive the connexion between truths, and foresee consequences in principles. It presides, therefore, in every mental operation.

The exercise of rational intuition implies the presence of objects, with respect to which it may be exerted. Wherever real intuition exists, rational intuition follows as a consequence. It is involuntary; and were we able, by a single effort, to grasp every subject of thought in all its minute particulars, could we hold them up at once to the immediate vision of the mind, truths, which are now the deductions of laborious reasoning, would become axioms. But the power which we possess, of thus directly contemplating objects, is inadequate to such an effort. It is restricted in its operation within a narrow compass: and were the total of our knowledge limited to that which is strictly intuitive, we should be condemned to a lamentable degree of intellectual poverty. It is by the aid of the signs which language affords, that we are enabled to exercise rational intuition, when the real view of its objects is no longer possible.

To obtain a clear idea of a new and complicated machine, we observe carefully all its parts. When we recall the same machine to mind, we rapidly retrace the image, not at once of the whole, but of the individual parts successively. The idea of this machine cannot be perfect, until the detail of particulars is filled up. This, which is the process of real intuition, is at once tardy and laborious. Were it necessary that the elements of every complex idea should be thus set in array before the mind, as often as that idea is recalled, it is evident that no room would remain for the exercise of rational intuition; in short, that our reasonings must sink under their own weight, and that the extension of our sphere of knowledge, beyond the list of truths which receive the name of axioms, would be impossible. But happily this is not necessary. A single brief sign takes the place of a load of details, and, like the light and portable representative of a metallic currency, enables us to use our wealth, without being encumbered by its weight.

Names, further, enable us not merely to dispense with this mass of particulars; but they afford us the means, also, of operating upon objects, which cannot be submitted to real intuition. Take, for example, the word man. To form a general idea of man, embracing all those properties, whether of mind or of body, in which the individuals of the human race constantly resemble each other, and rejecting every particular, not appertaining to the whole family, is an acknowledged impossibility. Considering man as a collective, rather than an abstract term, the difficulty is equally great. It is too high an effort for the mind, really and at once to conceive a clear and distinct image of the various races, ages and sexes, which go to make up the world of mankind. Thus we perceive, that, though the terms of our language may not always be the names of images, which the mind can directly and immediately behold, they still represent objects of positive knowledge.