Library Collections: Document: Full Text

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January, 1845, at Boston. -- Matter of Josiah Oakes. A person who is insane, or delirious, may be confined, or restrained of his lib-erty, by his family, or by others, to such extent, and for such length of time, as may be necessary to prevent injury or danger to himself and others.

Such confinement and restraint may be in his own house, or in a suitable asylum or hospital.

The repetition and frequent occurrence of acts, without any motive sufficient to actuate persons of ordinary sense, are evidence of aberration of mind and in such cases, accumulation of proof becomes important.

Such aberration of mind will authorize the restraint of the person subject there-to, although he has not committed any actual violence.

This was a case of habeus corpus, prosecuted to procure the discharge from confinement of Josiah Oakes, who was committed to the McLean Hospital for the Insane, on the 16th of December last. The case was heard before the whole court, and the hearing occupied the whole of two days. The application of Mr. Oakes's sons for his admission into the asylum was produced, and their agreement to pay his board. All the proceedings appearing to have been regular, the court ruled that the burden was upon the petitioner to make out a sufficient case for his discharge. A large number of witnesses were called, who testified that they were acquainted with Mr. Oakes, and considered him a man of much industry and shrewdness, and also that they should not have inferred, from his conduct or appearance, during the last three months, that he was not in his right mind. Several of them said, however, that his faculties might have been affected by age. To sustain the detention of Mr. Oakes, the deposition of Dr. Bell was read, and a number of witnesses were called, among whom were Dr. John Fox, under whose immediate charge the prisoner was at the asylum, several members of the family, and other acquaintances. They testified to some irregularities in the conduct and conversation of Oakes, and Dr. Fox gave it as his decided opinion that he was insane. It appeared that Oakes had formerly been confined in the Asylum for ten days, for a temporary alienation of mind, and was then discharged as cured. His wife died in October last, and for a short time previous, and since her death, a change in his appearance had been noticed.* After the testimony was concluded, the counsel who opposed the petitioner stated that it was a mere question of evidence, and that he did not consider it necessary to argue it to the court. The counsel on the other side made an argument in favor of the release of Mr. Oakes.

*Mr. Odes, who is sixty seven years old, became infatuated after a young woman by the name of Sarah Jane Neal, and engaged to marry her a few days after the death of his wife. To prevent the marriage, prosecutions were commenced against her in the police court, by some members of the family, for lewdness of conduct.

B. F. Hallet and Geo. A. Smith, for the petitioner.
Buttrick, of East Cambridge, against the petitioner.

C. J. Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the court, said that the court had examined the testimony, and bestowed upon the case the time and attention which its great importance demanded. The subject was one in which every member of the community has a deep and abiding interest. The power of granting relief upon habeus corpus is, in one sense, a discretionary power. But a discretionary power is not an arbitrary power. In exercising it the court are bound by the rules of law, as applicable to the facts of each particular case. The circumstances under which persons may be legally detained are extremely various, and a correct judgment in each case requires the exercise of judicial discretion.

Mr. Oakes has been placed in an insane hospital, a known public establishment, with a responsible board of trustees; and so far it has always been regarded as a satisfactory and useful institution. It may be called a boarding-house, or a place of relief, protection and cure, for a person whose mind is diseased. It has been inquired by what power he is there confined? It has been argued, that the constitution makes it imperative upon the court to discharge any person detained against his will; and that by the common law, no person can be restrained of his liberty, except by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. But we think there is no provision, either of the common law or of the constitution, which makes it the duly of the court to discharge every person, whether sane or insane, who is kept in confinement against his will. The provision, if it be true, must be general and absolute, and not governed by any questions of expediency to suit the emergencies of any particular case.

The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty, is found in that great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or others. In the delirium of a fever, or in the case of a person seized with a fit, unless this were the law, no one could be restrained against his will. And the necessity which creates the law, creates the limitation of the law. In the case of an application to have a guardian appointed over the person and estate of an insane person, under the statute, some time must necessarily elapse before the appointment can be made, and during that time restraint may be necessary. If there is no right to exercise that restraint for a fortnight, there is no right to exercise it for an hour. And if a man may be restrained in his own house, he may be restrained in a suitable asylum, under the same limitations and rules. Private institutions for the insane have been in use, and sanctioned by the courts; not established by any positive law, but by the great law of necessity and humanity. Their existence was known and acknowledged at the time the constitution was adopted. The provisions of the constitution in relation to this subject must be taken with such limitations, and must bear such construction, as arise out of the circumstances of the case. Besides, it is a principle of law that an insane person has no will of his own. In that case it becomes the duty of others to provide for his safety and their own. But whose duty does it become? If we say of his children, he may have no children; if of his parents, brothers or sisters, he may have no relatives who can perform the duty. Those who are about him must exercise it. His children, his wife, his brothers or sisters are suitable persons to take the charge of him if they are at hand. But a stranger, in a hotel or a boarding-house, may become delirious, in that case it becomes incumbent on those about him to restrain him, for such time only as the necessity for such restraint continues. The same rule may apply in the case of some surgical operations, where a person cannot have any will of his own, and it becomes necessary that he should be held by others.